



Over time, voters no longer hold former governors accountable
for their economic policy successes and failures, paving the
way for them to seek office once more.
The writer F. Scott Fitzgerald once famously said, “There are no second acts in American lives”,
but does this apply to politicians as well? In new research using voting data for ex-governors for
the last forty years, George A. Krause finds that, over time, governors’ reputations on the
economic performance of their time in office declines, whether it is good or bad. He writes that
politicians’ wishing to maximize their odds of having a ‘second electoral act’ should run for office
as soon as they leave office if their record of economic performance is a good one, while those
with poor prior economic records should take a considerable break when it comes to seeking
office again. 
It is increasingly common in an era of career politicians, both in the United States and elsewhere, for voters to
witness either defeated or ‘retired’ politicians return once again to seek elective office. In fact, these politicians
return to the electoral arena as non-incumbents seeking either a different office, or one that they previously held. 
Recent examples of this include California Governor Jerry Brown, who returned to office in 2011 after two terms
in the 1970s and 1980s, and former Florida Governor Charlie Crist, who is currently seeking a return to his job in
Florida after holding the position from 2007 to 2011.
In new research, my co-author, Benjamin F. Melusky, and I seek to understand the electorate’s ‘stamina’ for
holding individual politicians accountable in election contests based on their economic performance in prior
elective office.  Our work departs from existing research on retrospective economic voting behavior focusing
exclusively on holding current incumbent politicians electorally accountable for their economic performance while
in office.
We examine whether the passage of time alters voters’ ability to reward and punish politicians by supporting them
for subsequent elective offices, based on their prior economic performance.  We also look at whether this
electoral accountability linkage varies based on the time frame used by voters when assessing how to vote based
on this economic performance. Addressing these puzzles is of vital importance for those interested in issues of
electoral accountability since our research provides novel insights regarding the extent and nature by which
voters can reward competent politicians versus weeding out incompetent ones who seek a ‘second act’ in office.
We find that six to eight years after politicians leave office, voters’ assessment of their economic performance,
positive or negative, has largely disappeared.
The core logic of our theory on reputation depreciation is most easily summarized by Figure 1. The theory
predicts that as time elapses between when politicians leave office and their next (future) election contest, the
way that voters value their past economic performance in office falls, even if that performance was effective or
ineffective. This theory also predicts that this reputation depreciation process is exacerbated the longer the
evaluative time frame used to evaluate prior economic performance.
Figure 1 – Implications of Reputation Depreciation Theory over time
We tested our reputation depreciation on
aggregate voting data for all individual
ex−governors seeking elective office as
U.S. Senator or governor from 1970-2010
in primary and general election contests for
either U.S. Senate or gubernatorial posts
covering the same political jurisdiction (115
observations).  Although the sample size is
somewhat modest and entails aggregate-
level observational data, we more
rigorously test the reputation depreciation
theory’s two main predictions.  The
consistency of the empirical findings given
this scrutiny of the data is encouraging
when it comes to offering compelling
empirical support for reputation
depreciation theory.
Figure 2 – Estimated Impact of Reputation Depreciation of Prior Economic Stewardship on Ex−Governors
Vote Share in Future Election Contest
 The predictions of reputation depreciation theory are empirically supported by the downward sloping lines in
Figure2 that show the estimates of how voters’ hold politicians accountable for economic performance falling over
time. Further, this reputation depreciation effect is much steeper when based on the ex-governor’s economic
record during their entire tenure in office (1.10 percentage vote share decline for each additional year they wait to
re-enter the electoral arena) compared to either retrospective economic evaluations made in either the final term
(0.37 percentage vote share decline for each additional year they wait to re-enter the electoral arena) or final year
(0.44 percentage vote share decline for each additional year they wait to re-enter the electoral arena).
Figure 3 – Estimated Impact of Reputation Depreciation of Ex−Governor’s Prior Economic Stewardship
on Their Expected Vote Share in a Future Election Contest
Figure 3 indicates that future electoral support converges for Above Average, Average, and Below Average
economic stewardship by ex-governors.  This pattern of convergence for performance accountability holds under
alternative time frames for making retrospective economic assessments. These varying performance levels
obtain roughly the same predicted vote share approximately six years (72 months) after exiting office as governor
under a tenure-based retrospective economic evaluation, and eight years (96 months) after leaving the
governor’s mansion based on assessing their economic performance in either their final term or final year in
office.
Our findings have two broader implications for understanding electoral accountability in democratic settings. 
First, ex-governors’ reputation, rooted in economic performance, is a rapidly depreciating asset which benefits
ineffective ex-governors by increasing their prospects for a ‘second act’ in major statewide elective office, while
diminishing those prospects for effective ex-governors whose prior record in office justifies greater electoral
support by voters than it actually receives.  This counterintuitive pattern of falling electoral gains from effective
economic performance reveals that behavioral biases get worse over time in terms of electoral accountability,
which is hardly surprising.  In turn, the theory and evidence advanced in our research suggests that politicians’
wishing to maximize their odds of having a ‘second electoral act’ should run for office as soon as exiting current
office if their prior record of economic performance is strong, while those with poor prior economic records should
take a considerable break when it comes to seeking subsequent elective office.
Finally, our evidence suggests that term limits, and other candidate-eligibility restrictions that force incumbent
politicians out of office by means other than electoral defeat, may have the unanticipated effect of reducing
electoral accountability by unjustly rewarding ineffective politicians, while punishing effective ones.  Holding
currentincumbent politicians electorally accountable for their performance in office is a much easier task in a
democracy than to do so for non-incumbent politicians with a distant prior record of performance.  Although
political ‘second acts’ often do occur in American politics, our research suggests that they may very well come at
the expense of reducing electoral accountability, and hence, diminishing the caliber of democratic performance.
This post is based on George A. Krause and Benjamin F. Melusky’s article “Retrospective Economic Voting and
Intertemporal Dynamics of Electoral Accountability in the American States” forthcoming in the Journal of Politics
(November 2014). An advanced online publication version of their article can be obtained here. 
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